Razib Khan One-stop-shopping for all of my content

July 28, 2018

South Asian nationalism

Filed under: Nationalism — Razib Khan @ 2:01 pm


I happen to have Saloni’s genotype and she is certainly closer genetically to Sindhis than to most other South Asians. That being said, my own response to her tweet is this: my personal experience is that many liberal Pakistani & Indian Americans are highly nationalistic.

To be honest, it’s mostly Indian Americans. I don’t know too many hyper-nationalistic Pakistani Americans. I think that has to do with the fact that despite India’s social-political problems, its democratic and pluralist history, along with the international appeal of Mahatma Gandhi, makes it easier to be an Indian nationalist than a Pakistani nationalist if you are an American.

Also, there is a cultural “code-switching” that is common among Indian Americans, where they are fluent in, and totally embedded within, a Left-of-centre cultural zeitgeist in the American landscape. But, they also are comfortable switching into their parents’ more Indian nationalist views in different contexts. Rather than synthesizing the two worldviews (which may not be possible), Indian Americans just switch facultatively between the two, because the two social milieus never really engage each other.

Because I am Bangladeshi American it is hard for me to relate. Bangladesh is a very young nation. Both my parents have spent more than 3.5 times of their life living in the United States than an independent Bangladesh. In fact, both lived as Pakistanis for far longer than they lived as Bangladeshis! Additionally, it is not a major geopolitical player, and there are ambiguities with the relationship to both India and Pakistan enough that socially my family has felt comfortable with both Indians and Pakistanis in the USA.

P.S. I do get annoyed when I’m identified as Pakistani American by people just because of my last name. Since I am not vocal about being a “Bangladeshi American” I only find out later people had assumed I was Pakistani. Apparently, in some Indian circles, I am known as a “Pakistani American geneticist”, albeit not a particularly nationalistic Pakistani (told to me by an Indian journalist friend).

June 9, 2018

Gene Expression 2018-06-09 00:09:44

Filed under: History,Nationalism — Razib Khan @ 12:09 am

One of the major conclusions of Diarmaid MacCulloch’s The Reformation is that Protestantism only captured societies with finality when the most powerful temporal leader pushed for the change from above or maintained the pressure. The “magisterial” Reformation succeeded in those nations where the king or the most powerful aristocrats defended Protestantism and made it their own.

In contrast, in much of Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia, vast territories which had been won over to Protestantism were slowly brought back to Catholicism over the course of the 17th century under imperial direction and force. The process is outlined in Benjamin Kaplan’s Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe. It was a deliberate campaign to retake ground lost by the Habsburg monarchy and the Catholic Church.

The grinding down of Protestant faith in Hungary left such bitter feelings that Hungarian Calvinists marched with the armies of the Ottomans in the late 17th century during the Battle of Vienna. Even today the center of Hungarian Calvinism is in the far east, which was longest under the protection, neglect and toleration of the Ottomans.

French and Polish Protestants were well represented among the elites and parts of the nobility. Both states offered the Protestants a modicum of toleration, more or less, but in neither instance they did they capture the monarchy. In France, the Protestant Henry IV famously converted to Roman Catholicism, because the monarchy of the French state was tied so closely to the old religion. Polish Protestants, always a minority but concentrated among the upper echelons, slowly lost their position in society over the 17th and 18th centuries, to the point where being ethnically Polish and being Roman Catholic were synonymous. In contrast, the French Protestants suffered a major immediate shock when Louis XIV revoked the toleration and independence that they had enjoyed explicitly. They either had to convert, emigrate, or retreat deep into isolated areas such as the Massif Central.

The maxim adopted in 1555 was cuius regio, eius religio. “Whose realm, his religion.”

But did this really hold? Henry VIII certainly dragged an England that wasn’t entirely comfortable with leaving Catholicism, especially in the north, to Protestantism (though not too far, as the Puritans would learn!). The Scandinavian monarchs transitioned their nations rather quickly to Lutheranism. The Dutch Protestant minority, motivated, concentrated among elite elements, rebelled against their Catholic Habsburg monarch, but rallied under the Protestant House of Orange.

And yet there were other cases where cuius regio, eius religio did not hold. Arguably Henry IV’s conversion to Catholicism illustrates that the monarch was not all powerful…but this case is confounded by the reality that his kingship was conditional on his conversion.

In 1613 John Sigismund of the House of Hohenzollern made public his conversion to Calvinist Reformed Christianity. His Lutheran subjects balked, and did not follow him. Prussia remained a predominantly Lutheran domain with Calvinist rulers for hundreds of years.In 1697 the Wettin House of Saxony converted to Catholicism. While a minority of the subjects of the Hohenzollerns were Reformed Christians, almost no Catholics were present in the domains of the Lutheran Electorate. The overthrow of James II of England in part due to his Catholicism shows that by the latter half the 17th century cuius regio, eius religio did not hold.

The people were self-conscious in having a particular religious identity, and top-down pressure would be met and resisted strenuously.

It is sometimes stated that nationalism and self-identity emerged as late the French Revolution. I do not agree with this. Rather, I agree with Azar Gat’s position in Nations, that nationalism has deep historical and cultural roots. But that does not mean that I believe English self-identity in 1300 is and was the same as English self-identity in 1800. The Gordon Riots of 1780 illustrate how a strident Protestantism had become part and parcel of English national self-identity. In contrast, though there were religious conflicts between the early 16th century (with some rural peasants, especially in the north, retaining loyalty to the Catholic religion) and into the period of the English Civil War, the ultimate outcome seems to have been a matter of mobilizing elites, and up until the overthrow of Charles II retaining the favor of the monarch.

At some point the English monarchy personified the nation. The nation was not simply the extension of the monarch. Anti-German sentiment during the First World War resulted in the switch of their dynastic name from Saxe-Coburg & Gotha to Windsor.

Today in the age of social media we talk about the power of the mob. But it seems like something happened between 1500 and 1750 in much of Western Europe. Nations-states shifted from being syndicates of elite interest groups ad powerful individuals, to becoming expressions of popular will and sentiment. This preceded democracy or liberalism by generations, and it was a gradual process. Mass society and identity emerged. Immovable, with its own will.

And this had happened before historically, from Greek democracies to the Roman republic. Polities were reflections of the public. At some point citizens become subjects, and the populace were simply resources from which to extract rents to fund aristocratic positional contests. The information revolution of the printing press, and economic development more generally, changed the calculus. The past came back.

These sorts of dynamics are universal, cyclical, and playing out to differing extents across the world.

Related: On the rectification of names and religion. A post over at Brown Pundits.

Gene Expression 2018-06-09 00:09:44

Filed under: History,Nationalism — Razib Khan @ 12:09 am

One of the major conclusions of Diarmaid MacCulloch’s The Reformation is that Protestantism only captured societies with finality when the most powerful temporal leader pushed for the change from above or maintained the pressure. The “magisterial” Reformation succeeded in those nations where the king or the most powerful aristocrats defended Protestantism and made it their own.

In contrast, in much of Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia, vast territories which had been won over to Protestantism were slowly brought back to Catholicism over the course of the 17th century under imperial direction and force. The process is outlined in Benjamin Kaplan’s Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe. It was a deliberate campaign to retake ground lost by the Habsburg monarchy and the Catholic Church.

The grinding down of Protestant faith in Hungary left such bitter feelings that Hungarian Calvinists marched with the armies of the Ottomans in the late 17th century during the Battle of Vienna. Even today the center of Hungarian Calvinism is in the far east, which was longest under the protection, neglect and toleration of the Ottomans.

French and Polish Protestants were well represented among the elites and parts of the nobility. Both states offered the Protestants a modicum of toleration, more or less, but in neither instance they did they capture the monarchy. In France, the Protestant Henry IV famously converted to Roman Catholicism, because the monarchy of the French state was tied so closely to the old religion. Polish Protestants, always a minority but concentrated among the upper echelons, slowly lost their position in society over the 17th and 18th centuries, to the point where being ethnically Polish and being Roman Catholic were synonymous. In contrast, the French Protestants suffered a major immediate shock when Louis XIV revoked the toleration and independence that they had enjoyed explicitly. They either had to convert, emigrate, or retreat deep into isolated areas such as the Massif Central.

The maxim adopted in 1555 was cuius regio, eius religio. “Whose realm, his religion.”

But did this really hold? Henry VIII certainly dragged an England that wasn’t entirely comfortable with leaving Catholicism, especially in the north, to Protestantism (though not too far, as the Puritans would learn!). The Scandinavian monarchs transitioned their nations rather quickly to Lutheranism. The Dutch Protestant minority, motivated, concentrated among elite elements, rebelled against their Catholic Habsburg monarch, but rallied under the Protestant House of Orange.

And yet there were other cases where cuius regio, eius religio did not hold. Arguably Henry IV’s conversion to Catholicism illustrates that the monarch was not all powerful…but this case is confounded by the reality that his kingship was conditional on his conversion.

In 1613 John Sigismund of the House of Hohenzollern made public his conversion to Calvinist Reformed Christianity. His Lutheran subjects balked, and did not follow him. Prussia remained a predominantly Lutheran domain with Calvinist rulers for hundreds of years.In 1697 the Wettin House of Saxony converted to Catholicism. While a minority of the subjects of the Hohenzollerns were Reformed Christians, almost no Catholics were present in the domains of the Lutheran Electorate. The overthrow of James II of England in part due to his Catholicism shows that by the latter half the 17th century cuius regio, eius religio did not hold.

The people were self-conscious in having a particular religious identity, and top-down pressure would be met and resisted strenuously.

It is sometimes stated that nationalism and self-identity emerged as late the French Revolution. I do not agree with this. Rather, I agree with Azar Gat’s position in Nations, that nationalism has deep historical and cultural roots. But that does not mean that I believe English self-identity in 1300 is and was the same as English self-identity in 1800. The Gordon Riots of 1780 illustrate how a strident Protestantism had become part and parcel of English national self-identity. In contrast, though there were religious conflicts between the early 16th century (with some rural peasants, especially in the north, retaining loyalty to the Catholic religion) and into the period of the English Civil War, the ultimate outcome seems to have been a matter of mobilizing elites, and up until the overthrow of Charles II retaining the favor of the monarch.

At some point the English monarchy personified the nation. The nation was not simply the extension of the monarch. Anti-German sentiment during the First World War resulted in the switch of their dynastic name from Saxe-Coburg & Gotha to Windsor.

Today in the age of social media we talk about the power of the mob. But it seems like something happened between 1500 and 1750 in much of Western Europe. Nations-states shifted from being syndicates of elite interest groups ad powerful individuals, to becoming expressions of popular will and sentiment. This preceded democracy or liberalism by generations, and it was a gradual process. Mass society and identity emerged. Immovable, with its own will.

And this had happened before historically, from Greek democracies to the Roman republic. Polities were reflections of the public. At some point citizens become subjects, and the populace were simply resources from which to extract rents to fund aristocratic positional contests. The information revolution of the printing press, and economic development more generally, changed the calculus. The past came back.

These sorts of dynamics are universal, cyclical, and playing out to differing extents across the world.

Related: On the rectification of names and religion. A post over at Brown Pundits.

September 21, 2010

Swedes are not sexist or nativist

A party, the Sweden Democrats, is about to enter the Swedish parliamanent which is described in this way in Wikipedia:

The party has its origins in the nationalist movement Bevara Sverige Svenskt (”Keep Sweden Swedish”)…During the mid 1990s, the party leader Mikael Jansson strove to make the party more respectable, modelling it after other “euronationalist” parties, most prominently the French National Front. This policy continues to be followed by the present leader Jimmie Åkesson. This effort included ousting openly extremist members.

Yes. More respectable by modeling itself on the National Front. Here’s a bit about the organization which eventually grew into the Sweden Democrats:

Bevara Sverige Svenskt (”Keep Sweden Swedish”) was a Swedish nationalist movement based in Stockholm and is a slogan used by various Swedish nationalist parties. The stated objective of the BSS movement, and the aim of the slogan, was to initiate a debate in order to reduce immigration from non-European countries and repatriate non-ethnic Swedes.

The Swedes, and the world, are shocked. Should they be? From what I can tell the Social Democratic Party of Sweden no longer has a hegemonic grip on Sweden’s politics. But the core working class base of such coalitions is shrinking because of economic restructuring throughout the developed world, with the remnants often defecting to Right-populism. Today Gunnar Mydral would have to look to writing a book about his own nation, which has about the same foreign born proportion as the USA (though that is a touch deceptive as many of these are other Scandinavians or Finns).

This prompted me to look in the World Values Survey. Specifically, the last wave which started around 2005. One thing you notice in the survey is that Swedes are very politically correct, even compared to their Nordic neighbors. I have read that the ecological awareness imputed to Native Americans in part because of the Noble Savage idea has actually resulted in a real shift and striving by many Native Americans to actually implement those ideals. Sometimes I wonder if the Swedes are so “progressive” and “forward thinking” in surveys because everyone always pats them on the back for being progressive and forward thinking. Sweden sure is the least sexist and nativist nation in the WVS.


There are two questions which ask about job preference in times of scarcity. First, “Employers should give priority to (nation) people than immigrants,” and second, “Men should have more right to a job than women.” There are three responses: agree, disagree, neither. Let’s code agree = 1, disagree = -1, and neither as 0. Weight by proportion and get an index of “nativism” and “sexism” within the population. If you get a score of -1, that would mean everyone was nativist or sexist. If you get 0, that would indicate perfect balance. 0.5, a touch on the nativist or sexist side. The plot below has sexism on the x-axis, and nativism on the y-axis.

natsex

Though I think racism is more taboo than sexism internationally (if Saudis explicitly treated blacks in their nation as they do women there would be a natural boycott. One of the reasons the Saudis banned slavery in 1960 had to do with protests which they kept encountering in the civilized world). But sexism is more taboo than nativism (I think there are important reasons for the rank order, but that’s not a matter for this post). The correlation between nativism and sexism is ~0.76, so variation in sexism explains 58% of the variation in nativism. As you can see Sweden is a definite outlier.

Note: don’t attach too much normative baggage to my use of the terms “sexist” and “nativist.” They seemed compact and communicated the underlying sentiments.

Here are the raw values:

Men should get preference in jobs over women
Country Agree Disagree Neither
Sweden 2.10% 94.10% 3.80%
Andorra 4.40% 89.90% 5.70%
Ethiopia 6.00% 85.60% 8.40%
Norway 6.50% 88.60% 5.00%
United States 6.80% 66.40% 26.80%
New Zealand 8.00% 72.60% 19.40%
Finland 9.60% 81.50% 8.80%
Netherlands 12.50% 81.40% 6.20%
Serbia 12.50% 63.10% 24.30%
Slovenia 13.60% 73.50% 13.00%
Australia 13.90% 64.70% 21.40%
Canada 14.30% 77.90% 7.80%
Great Britain 16.20% 76.10% 7.70%
Spain 17.40% 76.00% 6.60%
Peru 17.70% 72.80% 9.50%
Germany 17.80% 66.80% 15.40%
France 18.10% 73.80% 8.10%
Guatemala 19.10% 72.30% 8.60%
Hong Kong 21.60% 44.20% 34.30%
Uruguay 21.90% 69.30% 8.90%
Italy 22.00% 59.20% 18.80%
Switzerland 22.10% 62.90% 15.00%
Brazil 22.30% 64.10% 13.60%
Bulgaria 24.20% 52.60% 23.20%
Mexico 25.30% 67.60% 7.00%
Trinidad 25.30% 65.70% 8.90%
Rwanda 25.30% 64.20% 10.50%
Japan 27.10% 17.90% 55.00%
Argentina 27.70% 60.00% 12.30%
Chile 30.20% 46.30% 23.50%
Poland 30.80% 51.00% 18.20%
Thailand 32.30% 40.60% 27.20%
Ukraine 32.50% 44.70% 22.80%
Zambia 33.60% 51.50% 15.00%
Romania 35.20% 40.90% 23.90%
South Korea 36.50% 26.40% 37.10%
Cyprus 36.50% 46.40% 17.10%
Russia 36.60% 43.70% 19.70%
South Africa 37.10% 49.50% 13.40%
Moldova 38.10% 39.00% 22.90%
Viet Nam 40.80% 37.70% 21.50%
China 42.30% 32.70% 25.10%
Taiwan 43.60% 36.00% 20.40%
Malaysia 49.00% 15.20% 35.70%
Morocco 50.80% 33.20% 16.00%
India 51.40% 20.50% 28.10%
Burkina Faso 52.30% 34.80% 12.90%
Georgia 52.50% 26.10% 21.40%
Turkey 53.30% 29.80% 16.90%
Ghana 53.60% 37.40% 8.90%
Indonesia 55.40% 36.20% 8.40%
Mali 62.40% 22.80% 14.80%
Iran 69.40% 16.50% 14.10%
Jordan 88.20% 7.90% 3.90%
Egypt 89.10% 4.30% 6.60%

Natives should get preference in jobs over immigrants
Country
Sweden 11.80% 79.90% 8.30%
Andorra 29.80% 53.20% 17.00%
Norway 34.70% 57.30% 8.00%
Netherlands 40.10% 49.80% 10.20%
Canada 40.90% 46.10% 13.10%
Australia 41.60% 36.40% 21.90%
France 42.10% 46.40% 11.50%
Serbia 44.70% 28.80% 26.40%
Switzerland 48.00% 35.50% 16.50%
New Zealand 51.90% 29.30% 18.80%
Great Britain 52.90% 36.40% 10.60%
Ethiopia 54.70% 29.30% 16.00%
Finland 54.90% 30.80% 14.30%
United States 55.40% 20.00% 24.60%
Germany 55.70% 27.90% 16.40%
Spain 57.70% 34.20% 8.10%
Thailand 61.20% 16.80% 22.10%
Japan 62.70% 6.10% 31.20%
Italy 63.90% 19.10% 17.00%
Turkey 64.40% 23.20% 12.40%
Romania 65.10% 14.60% 20.30%
China 66.00% 13.70% 20.40%
Ukraine 69.90% 16.20% 13.90%
Burkina Faso 71.70% 18.80% 9.50%
Argentina 71.90% 17.40% 10.70%
Hong Kong 72.30% 3.80% 23.90%
Uruguay 72.50% 21.30% 6.30%
Rwanda 72.60% 18.00% 9.40%
Slovenia 73.70% 15.00% 11.30%
Viet Nam 74.30% 10.80% 14.90%
Mexico 74.80% 19.60% 5.60%
India 75.20% 6.10% 18.70%
Moldova 75.50% 8.50% 15.90%
Bulgaria 76.60% 14.70% 8.70%
Zambia 77.00% 11.40% 11.60%
South Africa 78.30% 11.00% 10.70%
Cyprus 78.60% 12.20% 9.20%
South Korea 78.90% 2.40% 18.70%
Guatemala 79.60% 10.20% 10.30%
Chile 79.80% 7.50% 12.70%
Brazil 81.40% 9.50% 9.10%
Russia 81.40% 9.00% 9.60%
Poland 81.60% 8.40% 10.00%
Peru 82.20% 12.50% 5.30%
Mali 83.80% 7.10% 9.10%
Trinidad 84.00% 10.80% 5.30%
Morocco 84.90% 5.60% 9.50%
Ghana 85.20% 8.60% 6.10%
Malaysia 86.10% 2.10% 11.80%
Georgia 87.00% 4.50% 8.60%
Indonesia 87.40% 5.50% 7.10%
Iran 89.00% 5.40% 5.60%
Taiwan 91.00% 3.80% 5.20%
Egypt 97.90% 0.20% 1.90%
Jordan 98.50% 0.80% 0.70%

Powered by WordPress