Razib Khan One-stop-shopping for all of my content

November 28, 2018

The battle for the soul of the Heart of Asia

Filed under: Indian Genetics,international relations,Tarim Basin,Xinjiang — Razib Khan @ 11:33 pm

Kumārajīva was one of the early translators of the Buddhist canon into Chinese. His father’s lineage was reputedly Indian, while his mother was from the elite of the city of Kucha, on the northern edge of the Tarim basin. It was one of the cities where a form of Tocharian was spoken. This enigmatic Indo-European language family is extinct and known from only a few examples in this region of the world (the different forms of Tocharian seem to have been mutually unintelligible, suggesting a long history in this region of the world for these languages). But Tocharian was not the only Indo-European language group that was represented in the Tarmin. Along the southern and western edge of the Taklamakan Iranian dialects were more common, such as in the city of Khotan.

Over the last 1,000 years, the Tarim Basin has undergone major changes. First, the collapse of the ancient Uyghur Turk Empire resulted in their retrenchment to the Tarim Basin. A previously pastoralist people, they became settled city-dwellers. By the time Genghis Khan rose to power, the Uyghurs had become a predominantly Buddhist people, with a focus around Turpan. They seem to have absorbed the predominantly Tocharian city-states of the eastern portion of the Tarim Basin.

But after 1000 AD a second change began to occur. A group of Turks, who spoke a Karluk dialect, converted to Islam and conquered Kashgar in the west of the Tarim Basin, and began to push eastward, conquering and converting the Buddhist city-states in turn. By 1400 the cultural expansion and military conquest reached the eastern fringe of the Tarim Basin, as Turpan and Hami were absorbed into the Islamic cultural sphere. With this, a new identity unified the city-states of the Tarim Basin. In language they spoke Karluk dialects, and in religion they were Muslim. In the 20th century the Uyghur ethnonym was resurrected in what was known as East Turkestan, but the cultural descendents of the ancient Uyghurs are actually the Yugurs (whose traditional language descends from that of Old Uyghur).

Click to Enlarge

This narrative will be familiar to anyone who reads a book such as Valerie Hansen’s excellent Silk Road. Hansen in particular focuses on the period when the Tarim Basin was at some equipoise between the west, east, and the south, with Sogdians, Turks, Chinese and some Indians, all being part of the dramatis personae of the cities of the Silk Road during the heyday of the Tang dynasty. And none of this should be surprising. Though this region of the world is divided by the highest mountains on earth, the geographic distance between Northern India, Transoxiana, and the Tarim Basin is quite minimal. As the crow flies, New Delhi is less than half the distance from Hotan as Lanzhou, in the far western province of China proper, Gansu.

9th century cave painting from Turpan

The past doesn’t always map easily onto our contemporary topographies. Some of the earliest Chinese contacts with Buddhism was through the devotions of an often blue-eyed people whose physical type was European if anything, who had no doubt learned of the religion ultimately through a chain of transmitters that went back to brown-skinned South Asians. This world did not match the demarcations which we take for granted today. It was a thing different.

Normally when I’m enjoining people to think outside of the boxes that they’re used to thinking in, I’m talking to people of white European descent, around whom the world has revolved for several centuries, and around whom they assume the world will revolve until the last day of universe. But today I’ll point to another group, and that is Indians.

A friend forwarded me this erudite post on Medium, The Rāma Story and Sanskrit in Ancient Xinjiang. It received 324 claps, which in my experience means that tens of thousands of people at minimum have read this piece.

Here is the first paragraph:

Most people do not know that until about a thousand years ago, the Tarim Basin (northwest of Tibet, which is the part of Xinjiang below the Tian Shin Mountains) was Indic in culture and it was a thriving part of the Sanskritic world; its people spoke the Gāndhārī language which many see as descended from Vedic Sanskrit, and Khotanese Saka, which is also closely related to Sanskrit. Perhaps the region to compare it most is Kashmir, to whose north it lay. There was also much interaction between the two regions with many scholars traveling from Kashmir to Khotan, and silk culture is believed to have passed from Khotan to Kashmir and then into India.

The bolded sections are misleading. The italicized section is correct. There was a great deal of Indian-Tarim Basin interaction. Sometimes directly. Sometimes through intermediaries (Sogdians). But it is simply wrong to imply that this is “Indic culture” in a way that communicates to the audience reading it the proper state of the facts.

First, the author makes some statements about the genetic connections of modern people in the Tarim Basin and Indians which are false. He does link to some papers, but they are old, and lack the power to really get at the questions that would allow us to accept or reject the hypothesis of affinity.

Since the HGDP has some Uyghurs in the dataset it’s easy to pull them, and compare them to various South Asians, Iranians, and Han Chinese.

Let’s look at the PCA:

You see a bit of an admixture cline here from the Han Chinese samples, to something more West and South Eurasian. If you run the cline outward toward the West and South Eurasians, it lands somewhere between Pathans and Iranians.

Let’s run Treemix with 4 migration edges. You see the results….

I believe most of the Iranians in this data are sampled from the west of the country. This explains the contrast, where Pathans are more South Asian, and more like Europeans, than the Iranians (at least when not taking into account the migration edge). The steppe genetic impact seems to have stronger in Turan and Khorasan, than the classical heart of Persian civilization in the Fars. The gene flow from the base of the Lithuanian-Pathan clade to the Uyghurs is indicative to me of the steppe genetic influence in this region, perhaps starting with the Afanasievo culture, and later the expansion of the Andronovo complex.

Finally, the requisite admixture analysis:

Menander I, Indo-Greek Buddhist king

These data don’t reject the thesis that the Tarim Basin in the years before 1000 AD were dominated by “Indic culture.” That is because Indic culture is separate from the predominant element that characterizes Indic genes. There was almost certainly some gene flow from northwest India into the Tarim Basin. But it was likely relatively modest. Nevertheless, it is quite possible to characterize someone as having been substantially Indic in their cultural orientation no matter their genetic provenance. The great Greco-Bactrian king, Menander, seems to have been a patron of Buddhism, which was then still perceived as a fundamentally Indian religion.

In the centuries around 400 AD the Chinese still described Buddhism as a foreign “Western religion,” in particular, from India. Indian translators of Buddhist texts are a common presence in China and elsewhere in East Asia during this period, because the original works were in Indian languages. Meanwhile, Chinese Buddhists made pilgrimage to India, in part to retrieve texts from the great ancient monasteries.

But by the end of the Tang dynasty Buddhism was no longer thought of as simply an Indian religion. Though Confucian and Daoist critics never failed to point out its foreign origins, it was clearly indigenized. By the Song dynasty no more Indian translators are mentioned. And, by this period Buddhism in South Asia itself was in serious decline, first in the face of a newly vigorous set of religious practices which we call Hinduism, but also due to the predations of Turkic Muslim invaders, who destroyed many of the great monasteries.

The primary takeaway here though is that the semantic pointers we provide to the audience often give them implications which are not warranted. For example, when scholars describe Classical Greeks as ethnocentric Europeans, that misleads many modern people into thinking that the concept of European as we understand it today entailed the same things then that it does today. The Classical Greeks were part of a broader Mediterranean civilization, and culturally at least as distinct from the peoples of Northern Europe as they were those of the Levant. Their ethnocentrism was of a very different kind than that that developed in Europe in the 19th century, after the Congress of Vienna with the synthesis between resurgent Christian chauvinism and biological essentialism.

A similar issue crops up in discussion of ancient India and Indians. In Sanjeev Sanyal’s The Ocean of Churn he assumes that the Indo-Aryans who clearly were part of the military elite of the Bronze Age Syria state of Mitanni were Indian. First, the reality is that in the Bronze Age “Indians” as we understand them today did not exist. While Mitanni flourished in the Upper Euphrates region, the great cultural complex that was the Indus Valley Civilization was unwinding, to be succeeded by a simpler society. The biological and cultural synthesis that we think of as Indian today had not come into being in the totality. Second, the Indo-Aryan elite of the Mitanni (who had quickly switched their language to the Hurrian of their subjects) likely never had any experience of India. Rather, in the coalitions of steppe agro-pastoralists the Indo-Aryans were distinct from the Iranians, and one branch of the former seems to have pushed westward into the Near East, and another gone eastward to India.

Warriors from Bronze Age Pylos

Ultimately, what is in a label? The Greeks of the Mycenaean period spoke Greek. They worshipped some Greek gods that persisted down to the Classical period. But their descendants had only the vaguest of ideas about these people. When archaeologists of the 19th and 20th century excavated Bronze Age sites in Greece they assumed that people were not Greek. The assumption was that the Greeks of the Classical period descended from people who had come down from the Balkans during the Dark Age (the Dorians). The decipherment of Linear B shocked the world. These people spoke Greek. But culturally they were very different from the Classical Greeks.

To understand the world we must reassemble and filter it in categories what are comprehensible to us, that give us meaning. But we should never confuse the categories and concepts that are our tools for the reality that is out there. Our words always collapse distinctions, and erase subtleties. The further we go back into the past, the greater the disjunction between our categories and the details that they propose to bracket.

In the specific context of Indian history and the controversies and co-options I see bubbling to the surface due to the disruptive impact of genetics, is the fact that for many of the most motivated protagonists history began with Mahmud of Ghazni. For some, the Indo-Aryans are seen as precursors to the Turkic Muslims. And so the alien becomes the indigene, and the indigene becomes the alien. For others, the Indo-Aryans are the root and basis of the Hindu Rashtra. Due to this they must by necessity be grounded in Bharat Matā everlasting. The truth from where I stand does not suggest that either narrative is correct. The Indians of today, whether from the southern tip of the subcontinent, or the high fastness of Kashmir, are not comprehensible without the Aryans of the Vedas. But the Aryans are of the Vedas are not comprehensible without the the Punjab, without their residence and immersion in the Indian subcontinent. They came from elsewhere, but they became who they were because of their emulsification in the matrix of South Asian people and environments.

Similarly, Central Asia, from Xinjiang to the Caspian, from the fringe of Siberia to the edge of India, occupies a central pivot on the World Island. Both receiving and transmitting, over the past 2,000 years it has transformed itself many times, and yet retained some elements of continuity. There is no reason that India, China, or Russia should claim it as a natural extension of their own civilizational development. It was, and is, part of them all and yet not all of any.

September 4, 2018

Complementarity in the 21st century

Filed under: China,international relations,science fiction — Razib Khan @ 6:41 pm

The late Gordon R. Dickson wrote a series of books in a (mostly) future history termed The Childe Cycle. I’ve read a substantial number of the books in this series, and it’s rather uneven. On the whole, I would say that the earlier books are better than the later works. Dickson died before he could complete the series, but I don’t think that’s really that big of a deal, because the books are only loosely connected. I read the novels and short stories of the series all out of order, and it wasn’t a problem.

One of the interesting aspects of the universe is that there are separate human cultures/ethnicities that inhabit different planets and specialize in different economic tasks. If you look closely, the system doesn’t make economic sense, but that’s OK, we’re talking a setting for space opera.

Of the “splinter cultures,” two of them inhabit planets very close to each other in the same solar system, Newton and Cassida. Newton is home to pure scientists, while Cassida is a world of applied engineers. In Young Bleys it is stated that the engineers of Cassida admire and envy the scientists of Newton.

My point in posting about this is to a great extent I imagine that the United States of America will be the “Newton” of our world for a while longer. But, other nations will be will Cassida (you can guess which), and others the Friendlies. I don’t know who the Exotics or Dorsai might be, and the analogy might breakdown there.

July 10, 2018

The hegemon and world-citizen

Filed under: Diplomacy,International Affairs,international relations — Razib Khan @ 1:16 am

On occasion, I read a book…and forget it’s title. I usually manage to recall the title at some point. For the past five years or so I’ve been trying to recall a book I read on Asian diplomatic history written by a Korean American scholar. Today I finally recalled that book: East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute.

The reason I’ve been trying to remember this book is that I’ve felt it told a story which is more relevant today than in the late 2000s, when the book was written. From the summary:

Focusing on the role of the “tribute system” in maintaining stability in East Asia and in fostering diplomatic and commercial exchange, Kang contrasts this history against the example of Europe and the East Asian states’ skirmishes with nomadic peoples to the north and west. Although China has been the unquestioned hegemon in the region, with other political units always considered secondary, the tributary order entailed military, cultural, and economic dimensions that afforded its participants immense latitude. Europe’s “Westphalian” system, on the other hand, was based on formal equality among states and balance-of-power politics, resulting in incessant interstate conflict.

Here’s my not-so-counterintuitive prediction: as China flexes its geopolitical muscles, it will revert back to form in substance, forging a foreign policy predicated hierarchical relationships between states, while maintaining an external adherence to the system of European diplomacy which crystallized between the Peace of Westphalia and the Congress of Vienna. “Diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” if you will.

September 19, 2017

Stanislav Petrov and our common humanity

Filed under: international relations,Soviet Union,Stanislav Petrov — Razib Khan @ 8:01 pm


The first time I watched Gorky Park in the 1980s I remember how strange it was to see citizens of the Soviet Union, or as we called them all then irrespective of ethnicity, “Russians,” with normal human motivations and concerns. In other words, depicted in the fullness of their humanity.

As a child in Reagan’s America what we knew about Russians was that they were citizens of the Soviet Union, and what we knew about the Soviet Union were military parades and the dour mien of their leaders. When Mikhail Gorbachev emerged on the scene it didn’t really humanize the citizens of the Soviet Union. Rather, he was a totem or exemplar of a new spirit in the world, and that perhaps we weren’t all doomed to nuclear annihilation.

As for Russians. Who were they? In the 1990s they were our allies somehow, at least on paper. I think the truth of the matter is that we did take advantage of them as a nation and a people who were experiencing difficulties, insofar as America maneuvered itself into even more advantageous positions while they were down on their luck. Eventually, the images of godless Communists faded in the 1990s…to be replaced by kleptocrats and Russian mafia.

This is not to say I do not believe Communism was evil. I do believe it was evil. But, normal human beings with the same concerns and aspirations as those in the West were part of a system, which on occasion made them the tools of evil in this world. For that, perhaps they must be judged. Some say the same of American citizens. I may disagree in the particulars…but the principle is the same.

I bring this up because recently we found out that Stanislav Petrov died last spring. His story is well known at this point; he made a judgment call and ignored a false alarm that five American ICBMs were headed toward the Soviet Union. He acted humanely in a moment of high drama. As an American we are so often drilled into repeating the mantra we are the “good guys.” Petrov shows us that decency persisted even in the “evil empire.”

July 9, 2017

Our civilization’s Ottoman years

Filed under: Culture,International Affairs,international relations — Razib Khan @ 9:29 pm

Some right-wing intellectuals are wont to say that multicultural and multiracial empires do not last. This is not true. Historically there are plenty which lasted for quite a long time. Rome, Byzantium, and the Ottomans, to name just a few of the longest. But, though they were diverse polities modern liberal democratic sensibilities would have been offended by them. That is because these empires were ordered and centered around a hegemonic culture, with other cultures accepted and tolerated on the condition of submission and subordination.

The Ottoman example is the most stark because it was formally explicit under the millet system by the end of its history, though it naturally evolved out of Islamic conceptions of the roles of dhimmis under Muslim hegemony. For 500 years the Ottomans ruled a multicultural empire. Yes, it decayed and collapsed, but 500 years is a good run.

I bring up the Ottoman example because I was having a discussion with a friend of mine, an academic, and he brought up the idea that the seeming immiseration of the middle to lower classes in developed societies will lead to redistributive economic policies. Both of us agree that immiseration seems on the horizon, and that no contemporary political movement has a good response. But I pointed out that traditionally redistributive socialism seems most successful in relatively homogeneous societies, and the United States is not that. American society is diverse. Descriptively multicultural. There would be another likely solution.

Eleven years ago Amartya Sen wrote a piece for The New Republic which could never get published in the journal today, The Uses and Abuses of Multiculturalism. In it he looked dimly upon the emergence of plural monoculturalism. Today plural monoculturalism is the dominant ideal of the identity politics Left, with cultural appropriation in vogue, and separatism reminiscent of the 1970s starting to come back into fashion. Against plural monoculturalism he contrasted genuine multiculturalism. I think a better word for it is cosmopolitanism.

The Ottoman ruling elite was Sunni Muslim, but it was cosmopolitan. The Sultan himself often had a Christian mother, while during the apex of the empire the shock troops were janissary forces drawn from the dhimmi peoples of the Balkans. This was a common feature of the Islamic, and before them Byzantine and Roman empires. The ruling elites exhibited a common ethos, but their origins were variegated.

Many of the Byzantine emperors were not from ethnic Greek Chalcedonian Christian backgrounds (before the loss of the Anatolian territories many were of Armenian, and therefore non-Chalcedonian, origin). But the culture they assimilated to, and promoted, as the core identity of the empire was Greek-speaking and Chalcedonian, with a self-conscious connection to ancient Rome. I can give similar examples from South Asia or China. Diverse peoples can be bound together in a sociopolitical order, but it is invariably one of domination, subordination, and specialization.

But subordinate peoples had their own hierarchies, and these hierarchies interacted with the Ottoman Sultan in an almost feudal fashion. Toleration for the folkways of these subordinate populations was a given, so long as they paid their tax and were sufficiently submissive. The leaders of the subordinate populations had their own power, albeit under the penumbra of the ruling class, which espoused the hegemonic ethos.

How does any of this apply to today? Perhaps this time it’s different, but it seems implausible to me that our multicultural future is going to involve equality between the different peoples. Rather, there will be accommodation and understandings. Much of the population will be subject to immiseration of subsistence but not flourishing. They may have some universal basic income, but they will be lack the dignity of work. Identity, religious and otherwise, will become necessary opiums of the people. The people will have their tribunes, who represent their interests, and give them the illusion or semi-reality of a modicum agency.

The tribunes, who will represent classical ethno-cultural blocs recognizable to us today, will deal with a supra-national global patriciate. Like the Ottoman elite it will not necessarily be ethnically homogeneous. There will be aspects of meritocracy to it, but it will be narrow, delimited, and see itself self-consciously above and beyond local identities and concerns. The patriciate itself may be divided. But their common dynamic will be that they will be supra-national, mobile, and economically liberated as opposed to dependent.

Of course democracy will continue. Augustus claimed he revived the Roman Republic. The tiny city-state of Constantinople in the 15th century claimed it was the Roman Empire. And so on. Outward forms and niceties may be maintained, but death of the nation-state at the hands of identity politics and late stage capitalism will usher in the era of oligarchic multinationalism.

I could be wrong. I hope I am.

November 28, 2010

Taking the end of the age seriously

I am about two-thirds of the way through Why the West Rules-for Now: The Patterns of History, and What They Reveal About the Future, and I have to agree with Tyler Cowen’s assessment so far. The author is an archaeologist, and though a little less shy in regards to general theory than most in his profession, he still seems to exhibit the tendency to focus on thick-detail without any elegant theoretical scaffolding. In some ways it is an inversion of Gregory Clark’s A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World, which manifests an economist’s preference for stylized system-building at the expense of the messy residual. Why the West Rules has added almost no broad-brush theoretical returns beyond what you could find in Guns, Germs and Steel and The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. Though the author has a lot of scrupulously footnoted detail which probably makes Why the West Rules a worthy read.

But this post isn’t a review of Why the West Rules, rather, it’s a lament as to the total intellectual unpreparedness of the West’s intellectual class for the de facto end of the age of white supremacy,* the high tide of which is documented in the final chapters of this book (I skimmed them chapters ahead of time). The de jure end of the age of white supremacy probably spanned the victory of the allies during World War II down to desegregation in the United States in the 1960s. But despite the official end of the ideology of white racial superiority, the white-majority nations of the world were and are objectively superior in metrics such as Human Development Index. On a per capita basis they will remain so for a while longer:

And yet the trend lines are converging between East Asian and developed white Western nations. We are now moving beyond the time when we can talk about ‘the West vs. the Rest.’ There are ~1.3 billion Chinese in China itself, which is approximately the total number of people of white European descent in the world.** In much of Africa China is a rising economic and social presence. There are likely more expatriate Chinese in Africa than there are expatriate whites. Enter “China + any region of the world” into Google, and you’ll come back with plenty of interesting results.

But from what I can tell Westerners, of all colors, are totally intellectually unprepared for the radical shift in geopolitics which is occurring as we speak. Kvetching about China’s trade surplus does not intellectual preparedness make. Most white liberals have an anti-colonialist outlook, and favor the liberation of peoples of color in the face of white supremacy. But this normative framework only makes sense in light of a model whereby white domination and agency are the preeminent considerations in the lives of the people of color. In much of the world that is not necessarily the case anymore. In Australia you have an inversion of the old narrative, insofar as an commodity boom driven by Chinese demand has arguably kept that nation’s economy relatively buoyant!

The white supremacy model (WSM) isn’t only found among white people. It’s very dominant among colored people who reflect on these issues. Indians are haunted by British colonialism. Latin Americans by Yankee imperialism. Middle Eastern Muslims by the Jewish-Western condominium. The Chinese still remember the de facto colonialism which their nation was subjected to after the Opium Wars.

In graphic terms what you have as a model is like so:

europerest

In the late 19th century the whole world became Greater Europe’s playground. Non-European thinkers had to respond to the European challenge. There was no other game in town. To some extent that response continued and elaborated after the collapse of European political hegemony in the 1950s and 1960s; ergo, postcolonialism.

This is probably more accurate today than the old model, and will certainly be more accurate within the next generation:

europerest2

800px-World_literacy_map_UNHD_2007_2008
Because of its population and economic dynamism China will naturally come to rival Greater Europe in its influence and impact on the rest of the world. No other nations besides East Asian ones have shown an ability to match Greater Europe in HDI. The map to the left of literacy rates is I believe a good predictor of potential median HDI and per capita economic productivity ceilings for the next generation or two. South Asia is the world leader in absolute concentrated human misery, both in illiteracy and malnutrition. I think India will be influential and powerful because of raw numbers, but there is no worry that it will be a per capita power. Africa is prospering thanks to the Chinese fueled commodity boom, but it too is low on the human and institutional capital totem pole to leverage its demographic dynamism. Australia is too small in population to be influential. If the trends in its economy remain, that it becomes in large part a commodity source for China, then I think it will be prey to being muscled by the East Asian superpower just as Latin American nations traditionally were by the United States, even without military intervention, because of the asymmetry in economic dependency. Latin American nations like Brazil are populous and on the ‘ascension graph’, but they have problems with wide variance in human capital, just like India.

In civilizational terms we are not going from a unipolar world to a multipolar world. We’re going from a unipolar world to a bipolar world. This means that there must be a revision to our intellectual toolkit. Critics of the West, whether they’re white or colored, still have a superficial understanding of the Dead White Men and their history. Islamic revisionists who make a case for the centrality and superiority of their tradition do so with the West as an explicit or implicit counterpoint. The indigenous traditions of India, Africa, or China, were not relevant to these arguments. Europe was the sun, around with other civilizational planets circled.

Not so any longer. Consider these headlines: China workers killed in Pakistan and Algeria: Xenophobia against Chinese on the rise in Africa. Or Brazil’s huge new port highlights China’s drive into South America. China eyes rail link to Chittagong. A pushcart war in the streets of Milan’s Chinatown. ‘Too Asian’? – Worries that efforts in the U.S. to limit enrollment of Asian students in top universities may migrate to Canada.

This is a different dynamic than the rise of the one-dimensional Arab and Soviet petro-states of the 1970s in a qualitative sense. China and its Diaspora are a full-throated economic counterweight to the two century international geopolitical and cultural dominance of Greater Europe. It is also a different dynamic than the migration of various colored peoples into Western nations after World War II, where these groups are slotted into the lower social and economic rungs, and draw hostility and contempt from some whites and patronizing sympathy and self-interested bureaucratic-managerial concern from others. Japan and the “Asian Tigers” were limited by their demographic modesty when set next to Greater European nations like the United States.

How should people readjust to this world? Obviously following economic statistics and political events are essential to recalibrating with judicious perspective and caution. The world’s intellectual classes, Western and non-Western, have been conditioned to white supremacy for so long that no one remembers a time when it was any different.*** One of the ironies of WSM is that non-whites rarely know the history or culture of other non-whites to the same extent that they know that of whites. In other words, South Asians know their history and that of whites, Africans know their history and that of whites, East Asians know their history and that of whites, etc. (the main exception may be Korea, which was colonized by the Japanese). It’s ironic because the implicit inference of WSM is that non-whites have common interests against the white master race. Though this is admittedly rational because the concerns, values, and motivations of the masters are more relevant than those of other helots. The term ‘master race’ has positive connotations while a ‘the cancer of human history’ has negative ones, but no matter, both indicate that the object of concern is worthy and of note. But the blind-spot in this mode of thinking is that colored people who supposedly have solidarity are totally ignorant of each other’s respective substance.

This was all of purely academic interest until the resurgence of East Asia, and China in particular. It is for example well known that Chinese have a strong racial consciousness. During the Maoist period this was dampened by ideology. China’s objective lack of development for most of the 20th century almost certainly suppressed some of the racial disdain which is an element of Han chauvinism. But the Chinese, like East Asians in general, have a degree of race consciousness which expresses on the surface to an extent that would be surprising and alarming to most whites, excepting perhaps Afrikaners, some white American Southerners, and partisans of nationalist parties in Europe. This predates the modern era insofar as the Chinese have a long history of dehumanizing ‘barbarians’ and looking down on dark-skinned peoples (e.g., see the reports of the legation sent to the Khmer kingdom of Funan, which lingered upon their nakedness and darkness of complexion). But the real genesis of contemporary attitudes may be rooted in the synthesis of Chinese folk attitudes and early 20th century racial anthropology, already evident in the writings of principals in the May Fourth Movement.

Contrary to the Chung Kuo science fiction future history I have no expectation that Han racism will lead to a genocidal war of extermination against the black and brown peoples of the world. Rather, the attitudes in common circulation in China and other East Asian nations must be understood by any politician, diplomat or businessman, who wants to operate in that region. Any dark-skinned South Asian who expects “Asian” fellow-feeling in China may be in for a surprise. Chinese opinions of people of African descent are even more checkered. During the days of Japan Inc. cultural fluency was already seen to be critical, but because China is one order of magnitude more populous than Japan in 30-40 years it will be much more of an international social and economic presence. Interestingly 20% of individuals on the internet are already Chinese nationals, vs. 5% of Japanese (though the difference in penetration rates is 30% vs. 80%).

Where does this leave us? By the end of our lives those of us in early adulthood will live in a bipolar world. China and the West will together be drivers of consumption. When it comes to development aid or investment in poorer nations the West will have a substantive rival. These two will hold up the sky together. With this will come more prominence of Chinese culture, and a necessity for an understanding of that civilization’s history, its values. Though I’m making a pragmatic and utilitarian case for understanding and knowledge here, I do want to enter into the record than an appreciation of the history of the Chinese is an understanding of the history of a substantial proportion of humanity. It is part of our common history, just as Greece and Rome are.

With that, at the end of this post are a list of books which I’ve found useful, and obviously memorable, in trying to understand the shape of the Chinese past, and how the present came to be. Personal preference and bias is obviously operative. The fact that a standalone work on Xun Zi is listed below, and Mencius is not, says a lot about my personal evaluation of the two in relation to each other.

* I use “white” as a compound of both genetic and cultural qualities. So, Turks are not classified as white in this sense, while Ashkenazi Jews are, even though both groups are equivalently white when compared to “reference” populations which no one would deny are white, such as the English, in a genetic sense. So a person of Turkish ethnic origin who converts to Christianity, such as Boris Johnson’s ancestor (originally Bey), can generally be accepted as white because of their appearance. In contrast, someone who has noticeable non-white appearance, a South Asian for example, remains non-white despite their Christianity.

** You can do the back-of-the-envelope pretty easily. Europe, + 0.70 X USA + Canada + Australia + New Zealand + 1/3 Latin America is a good approximation. Of course a substantial proportion of the other 2/3 of Latin Americans have some white European ancestry, but whiteness a privilege which generally comes only through purity of blood, so they can be ignored.

*** I would peg the closing of the previous multipolar world to the second half of the 18th century, though the fact of European dominance did not ripen until the Opium Wars, which illustrated that even the greatest of non-Euroepan powers was ineffectual against European military mobilization.

anlect31RSVQ5XFKL._SL500_AA300_china1
china2
china3china4china5china6china84china7china9

Powered by WordPress